

# Paying for Covid: what should policymakers do next?

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1<sup>st</sup> December 2021

# 1. Agenda

- The economics of a pandemic
- ‘Omicronics’
- How do we pay for all this?
- What does this mean for monetary policy?
- Q&A

## 2. Market 'failures' that justify state intervention

- Protection from a deadly virus is a 'public good': total benefits, including social benefits, are larger than private firms can charge for
- Spreading a virus is a negative 'externality': little incentive to avoid putting strangers at risk
- Almost impossible to get private insurance against a national lockdown
- Large transactions costs involved in closing and restarting businesses, or firing and then rehiring

### 3. Should we put a price on a human life?

- Health economists often put a monetary value on people's lives based on the number of years they have left, and the quality of that life ('**QALYs**'). This is simply about using **limited resources** in the fairest way.

1. Suppose it would cost £1 *billion* to prevent just *one* premature death. Would this be worth it?
2. Imagine you are allocating the last seat on a lifeboat as the Titanic sinks, and have a choice between rescuing a healthy child or a sickly old man.  
Whom would you save, and why?



## 4. “Health vs. economy”

- There is some **trade-off** between preventing premature deaths and protecting the economy
- But if the virus is not controlled, people might choose to stay at home, and the economy would be hit anyway
- You cannot judge the value of lockdowns (as many do) by looking only at the number of deaths *while Covid restrictions are in place*. What's the **counter-factual**?
- Locking down harder and sooner may increase the hit in the **short term**, but reduce it in the **long term**

## 5. Benefits of lockdowns

Most visible:

- the reduction in illnesses and deaths from **Covid** itself

But also

- The prevention of **other deaths** and harms (to young and old) if the NHS is overwhelmed with Covid patients
- Reduction in other communicable diseases, e.g. **flu**
- Fewer deaths from traffic **accidents, pollution**, and so on
- A **stronger economic recovery** in the longer term from getting on top of Covid more quickly

## 6. Costs of lockdowns

Most visible:

- The collapse in **economic activity**, including business closures, job losses and lost income
- The impact on the **public finances**


But also:

- Harms done to people with other conditions (e.g. **cancer patients**) not receiving the care they need
- Costs to **mental health** and wellbeing
- Harm to **education** and **job opportunities**
- Damage to **civil liberties** and confidence in government

## 7. Why this recession has been different

- The slump in **GDP** was inevitable and even *desirable*: we actually wanted people to stop doing what they would normally be doing, in order to save the lives of others
- Rather than stimulating growth, economic policy has focused on **shielding** the economy - while it is put in a state of temporary hibernation
- As long as the majority of **businesses, jobs** and **incomes** can be protected, normal economic activity should resume relatively quickly when the Covid threat fades...

## 8. ...and that's pretty much what's happened




## 9. Long-term economic impact

- OBR has assumed that Covid will reduce the long-run productive potential of the UK economy by 2% (aka 'economic scarring')
- This is based on (pessimistic?) assumptions about:
  1. **labour** supply (e.g. lower participation rates)
  2. **capital** stock (lower investment, earlier write-offs)
  3. total factor **productivity** (most debatable?)


# 10. 'Omicronomics'

- Main short-term risks:
  1. another '**pingdemic**' (shock to supply)
  2. voluntary changes in **consumer behaviour** (demand)
- Best things the UK government have done are:
  1. reopen the economy in the summer
  2. accelerate the **vaccine booster** programme...
- This has given the UK population a relatively high degree of (herd) **immunity**

# 11. 'Plan A'




# 12. UK Public Sector Borrowing and Debt



## 13. How will we pay for all this?

- There is no need to **pay back** debt: as long as the gov't can meet the interest payments, it can simply be rolled over
- The absolute size of the debt (£bns) matters much less than the size of debt relative to the size of the economy (% GDP)
- It helps when **interest rates** are lower than the growth rate of the economy (nominal GDP), and when a lot of the debt is held by the central bank
- There is **no rush**: the economic and fiscal outlook is still too uncertain, demand for government bonds is high, and tax rises (or spending cuts) could just slow the recovery
- Let growth (and inflation) reduce the debt burden instead

## 14. CPI Inflation (%, OECD measure)



## 15. Should we worry about 'stagflation'?

- 'Persistent high inflation combined with high unemployment and stagnant demand'
  - ✗ Even at 5%, UK inflation would be much lower than in the 70s (more than 20%)
  - ✗ Some good reasons to believe this jump in inflation will be temporary
  - ✗ Caused by lack of supply, not weak demand
  - ✗ Unemployment low, not high

## 16. But there are still risks

- Hardly any discussion of the **monetary** causes of inflation: too much cheap money chasing too few goods and services
- The ‘**transitory**’ prices pressures have been larger and longer-lasting than expected, and spreading
- ‘**Wood for the trees**’: if you strip out whichever prices happen to be rising the most, ‘underlying’ inflation will always appear to be low

# 17. What policy-makers should do about inflation

- Governments need to allow **markets** and price signals to do their job, e.g. end furlough to ease labour shortages, and don't cap energy prices!
- Ease burden on low-income households
- Not much that **central banks** can do in the short term, but can help to prevent a temporary increase in inflation from becoming permanent...

## 18. Issues for the Bank of England

- MPC has a narrower **inflation mandate** than the Fed, and the recovery in the UK economy has more momentum than in the euro area
- Current **QE** programme set to end shortly anyway
- Keeping inflation down over the longer term matters far more than the immediate impact of a small hike on borrowing or saving rates
- What is the MPC waiting for?

## 19. Some conclusions

- The **furlough** scheme was a great success, but it was right to end it
- There is no rush to tighten **fiscal** policy, but **monetary** policy is too loose
- **Context** and **credibility** are crucial in assessing impact of central bank decisions
- The other big debate is whether **the state** should shrink back again, or take a much bigger role in future too